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Introduction 
Eight months after Hurricane Maria, recovery efforts are still under way in Puerto Rico.1 As 
more than 50,000 hurricane victims were still without power as of mid-April 2018,2 
shortcomings in the implementation of disaster management by competent authorities continue 
to be documented.3  
This essay contributes to the important and necessary discussion on the situation in Puerto Rico 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria by assessing disaster recovery there through a human rights 
lens.  It argues that implementation of the human rights-based approach (HRBA) to disaster 
management would have resulted in a more effective recovery strategy in so far as it would have 
tailored recovery efforts specifically to the needs and protections of disaster victims. For the 
purposes of this essay, an HRBA to disaster management is a conceptual and operational 
framework developed by committees of experts that monitor State compliance with UN human 
rights treaties, also known as human rights treaty bodies.4  After providing background 
information on the impact of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico, this essay introduces the HRBA to 
disaster management and emphasizes, in particular, its innovative reach.  Lastly, this essay 
considers the excessive number of deaths that occurred in the months following Maria to show 
 
1 Nicole Acevedo and Istra Pacheco, No Deeds, No Aid to Rebuild Homes: Puerto Rico’s Reconstruction 
Challenge,” nbcnews (May 8, 2018) (available at https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/puerto-rico-crisis/no-deeds-
no-aid-rebuild-homes-puerto-rico-s-reconstruction-n868396, accessed on May 9, 2018). 
2 Danny Vinik, FEMA’s Plan Underestimated Puerto Rican Hurricane, Politico (Apr. 15, 2018) (available 
at https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/15/puerto-rico-hurricane-fema-disaster-523033, accessed on May 3, 
2018). 
3 Id. See also: Danica Coto, US Questions Why Power not Fully Restored in Puerto Rico, The Washington Post 
(May 8, 2018) (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-questions-why-power-not-
fully-restored-in-puerto-rico/2018/05/08/ff11624c-52e0-11e8-a6d4-
ca1d035642ce_story.html?utm_term=.40bd4363f5be, accessed on May 9, 2018); Arelis R. Hernández, Sluggish 
Recovery from Hurricane Maria Reignites Calls for Puerto Rico’s Statehood, Independence, The Washington Post 
(Apr. 28, 2018) (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-struggle-to-recover-from-hurricane-
maria-reignites-calls-for-puerto-ricos-statehood-independence/2018/04/28/e9284fe2-2c7d-11e8-8688-
e053ba58f1e4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0fec855da9d7, accessed on May 3, 2018); and Danny 
Vinik, How Trump Favored Texas over Puerto Rico, Politico (Mar. 29, 2018) (available 
at https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/27/donald-trump-fema-hurricane-maria-response-480557, accessed on 
May 4, 2018). 
4 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Monitoring the Core International Human Rights 
Treaties, (2018) (available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx, accessed on May 3, 
2018). 
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how implementation of the HRBA to disaster management would have minimized loss of lives 
and made a difference to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. 
1. Hurricane Maria: Impact and Flaws in its Management 
Hurricane Maria decimated Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, a few weeks after Hurricane 
Harvey ravaged Texas and Hurricane Irma hit Florida,5 thereby making the end of summer 2017 
uniquely challenging for the United States (U.S.) in terms of disaster management.  Hurricane 
Maria, however, was “a different class of disaster than Hurricanes Irma and Harvey.”6  As Jeff 
Weber, a meteorologist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research put it, “[i]t was as if a 
50- to 60-mile-wide tornado raged across Puerto Rico, like a buzz saw.”7  This being so, it is not 
surprising that the damage that Hurricane Maria caused had catastrophic dimensions.  According 
to UN estimates, the number of houses that Maria destroyed ranges from 30,000 to 90,000,8 and 
it is well-known that Maria obliterated Puerto Rico’s electric grid, thereby halting local provision 
of potable water since equipment to make water available to households and other facilities 
cannot work without power.9  
How did local and federal authorities respond to Hurricane Maria?  How were their recovery 
efforts?  While the U.S. reacted swiftly and with urgency to the damage Hurricanes Harvey and 
Irma caused in Texas and Florida, the U.S.’s relief to Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Maria has fallen significantly short.  The disaster assistance that local and federal authorities 
have provided to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico has not matched the magnitude of the destruction 
ensuing from the hurricane and lacked leadership at the highest levels of the federal 
 
5 While this short essay exclusively deals with the management of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, it should not be 
forgotten that Hurricane Irma struck the northern part of Puerto Rico on September 7, 2017 before making landfall 
in Florida on September 10, 2017.  Hurricane Harvey, on the other hand, hit Texas on August 25, 2017. 
6 Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening With the Relief Effort in Puerto Rico? The Atlantic (Oct. 4, 2017) (available 
at https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/what-happened-in-puerto-rico-a-timeline-of-hurricane-
maria/541956/, accessed on Apr. 24, 2018). 
7 Brian Resnick, Why Hurricane Maria is such a Nightmare for Puerto Rico, Vox (Sep. 22, 2017) (available 
at https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/9/21/16345176/hurricane-maria-2017-puerto-rico-san-juan-
meteorology-wind-rain-power, accessed on Apr. 27, 2018). 
8 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Puerto Rico: Human Rights Concerns Mount in Absence 
of Adequate Emergency Response, (Oct. 30, 2017) (available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Displa
yNews.aspx?NewsID=22326&LangID=E , accessed on Apr. 27, 2018). 
9 Kurtis Lee and Milton Carrero Galarza, Two Months after Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico Struggles to Regain 
Electricity and Thousands Flee the Island, Los Angeles Times (Nov. 19, 2017) (available 
at http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-puerto-rico-electricity-20171118-story.html, accessed on May 4 
2018); Devika Krishna Kumar, Power Crews Scramble to Puerto Rico after Maria Smashes its Grid, Reuters (Sept. 
21, 2017) (available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-maria-puertorico-power/power-crews-scramble-to-
puerto-rico-after-maria-smashes-its-grid-idUSKCN1BW2OF, accessed on May 4, 2018); Mekela Panditharatne, 
FEMA Says Most of Puerto Rico has Potable Water. That Can’t Be True, The Washington Post (Dec. 21, 2017) 
(available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/fema-says-most-of-puerto-rico-has-potable-water-that-cant-
be-true/2017/12/21/cf8d8ce0-e511-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html?utm_term=.fc1e74fe76ef, accessed on 
Apr.  25, 2018). 
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government.10  Moreover, said assistance was slow and has worsened the situation of hurricane 
affected persons.11  
One of the most glaring indicators of the ineffectual disaster management in Puerto Rico is the 
excessive number of deaths that occurred in the months following Hurricane Maria.  Reports 
published in December 2017 have found that while 64 died as a result of the immediate impact 
of Maria, over 1,000 more deaths occurred in its aftermath owing largely to various medical 
conditions such as sepsis and respiratory problems.12  Though several complex factors account 
for the unexpected and dramatic number of casualties, this essay focuses specifically on the lack 
of timely provision of health care due to discoordination between civilian and military health 
care providers involved in the Hurricane Maria recovery effort.  It has been reported that military 
health officials deployed in Puerto Rico on the U.S. Navy Hospital Ship Comfort in order to 
support overwhelmed local clinics and hospitals between October 3 and mid-November 2017, 
saw fewer Hurricane Maria victims than those that they could have actually treated for three 
main reasons.  First, local medical providers did not understand the protocol for the referral of 
patients to the military doctors as laid down by FEMA staff and local authorities once the 
Comfort arrived in Puerto Rico, thirteen days after Hurricane Maria struck.13  Second, in areas 
without working cell phones, land lines, and satellite phones it was impossible to refer patients to 
the military doctors.14  Third, federal authorities’ failure to organize a well-coordinated military 
effort in Puerto Rico limited the military doctors’ ability to work together with local medical 
providers in order to deliver timely medical care to hurricane victims.15  
 
10 [10] See Vinik, supra notes 2 and 3; supra note 6; Jeremy Konyndyk, Hurricane Maria Killed 64 Puerto Ricans. 
Another 1,000 Died Because the Disaster Response Was Inadequate, The Washington Post (Dec. 18, 2017) 
(available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/18/hurricane-maria-killed-64-puerto-
ricans-another-1000-died-because-the-disaster-response-was-inadequate/?utm_term=.40ba58c3e232, accessed on 
Apr. 24, 2018); and Alice Thomas, Meeting the Urgent Needs of Hurricane Maria Survivors in Puerto Rico, 




12 Frances Robles, Kenan Davis, Sheri Fink and Sarah Almukhtar, Official Toll in Puerto Rico: 64. Actual Deaths 
May Be 1,052, The New York Times (Dec. 9, 2017) (available 
at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/08/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-death-toll.html?_r=0, accessed 
on Apr. 24, 2018); Konyndyk, supra note 10. 
13 Leyla Santiago and Mallory Simon, There’s a Hospital Ship Waiting for Sick Puerto Ricans — but No One Knows 
How to Get on It, CNN (Oct. 17, 2017) (available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/16/health/puerto-rico-hospital-
ship/index.html, accessed on Apr. 24, 2018); and Sean Breslin, As Health Crisis Looms in Puerto Rico, Navy 
Hospital Ship Sits Mostly Empty, (Oct. 20, 2017) (available https://weather.com/news/news/2017-10-18-puerto-rico-
health-crisis-hurricane-maria-usns-comfort, accessed on Apr. 25, 2018). 
14 Frances Robles and Sheri Fink, Amid Puerto Rico Disaster, Hospital Ship Admitted Just 6 Patients a Day, The 
New York Times (Dec. 6, 2017) (available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-
hospital-ship.html, accessed on Apr. 28, 2018). 
15 Dan Lamothe, Clinton Pressed Trump to Deploy Hospital Ship Comfort to Puerto Rico. Now it’s Preparing to 
Go, The Washington Post (Sept. 26, 2017) (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017
/09/26/clinton-pressured-trump-to-deploy-hospital-ship-comfort-to-puerto-rico-now-its-on-the-
way/?utm_term=.9c49f03b1b44, accessed on Apr. 27, 2018); and Craig Hooper, It Took Comfort 39 Days to Get 
Pierside in Puerto Rico. That’s a National-Security Problem, Defense One (Nov. 6, 2017) (available 
at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/11/hospital-ships-hurricane-maria/142319/, accessed on Apr. 28, 2017). 
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The lack of timely provision of health care must also be read in light of reports suggesting that 
the contrast between the relief provided to disaster victims in Florida and Texas and the 
assistance delivered to those in Puerto Rico (including medical assistance) can be ascribed to the 
fact that Puerto Rico is an “unincorporated territory” rather than a State of the United Sates.  As 
a result of this legal status, the people of Puerto Rico have statutory U.S. citizenship which does 
not entitle them to the same rights and legal protections of other U.S. citizens.16  
2. The Human Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Management 
The situation in Puerto Rico could have been different had the U.S. taken the human rights-based 
approach (HRBA) to disaster management there.  The HRBA to disaster management has been 
developed by committees of international experts that monitor State compliance with UN human 
rights treaties, the so-called human rights treaty bodies.17  Implementing the HRBA in disaster 
and post-disaster settings means that measures to deal with a disaster and its consequences are 
designed and implemented for the very purpose of respecting, protecting, and fulfilling rights or 
dimensions of rights that, in the view of the treaty bodies, are most at stake during disasters. For 
example, the right to life, and the rights to food and adequate housing, which under UN human 
rights law are part of the normative content of the right to an adequate standard of living.18  The 
HRBA requires that the following pivotal human rights principles underpin disaster 
management: the principles of non-discrimination and equality; the principle whereby the 
protection and needs of those who are disproportionately affected by the harms of a disaster have 
to be  addressed as a matter of priority; the rights of disaster victims to be informed about 
governmental disaster management strategies and to participate in their drafting and 
implementation; and disaster victims’ rights to access justice and reparations in cases where they 
have suffered rights violations as a result of disaster mismanagement.19  The HRBA supersedes a 
notion of disaster response meant as a mere logistical effort to alleviate the sufferings of needy 
disaster-affected persons to replace it with a notion of disaster management that revolves around 
 
16 Vinik , supra note 3; supra note 8; Nick Cumming-Bruce and Frances Robles, U.S. Response to Storm-Hit Puerto 
Rico is Criticized by U.N. Experts, The New York Times (Oct. 30, 2017) (available 
at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/us/puerto-rico-whitefish-fbi-power-.html, accessed on Apr. 28, 
2018); Puerto Rico is Still in the Dark, The Washington Post (Nov. 17, 2017) (available 
at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/puerto-rico-is-still-in-the-dark/2017/11/17/7b516f94-c981-11e7-
8321-481fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.511b72d78ec6, accessed on Apr. 29, 2018). 
17 See for instance: Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report 
Haiti, CCPR/C/HTI/CO/1, para. 18 (Nov. 2014); Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Concluding Observations on the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports of the USA, 
CERD/C/USA/CO/6, para. 31 (May 2008); Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding 
Observations on the Initial Report of Nepal, CRPD/C/NPL/CO/1, para. 20 (March 2018); and Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 37 on Gender-Related Dimensions of 
Disaster Risk Reduction in the Context of Climate Change, CEDAW/C/GC/37 (Feb. 2018). 
18 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4, The Right to Adequate 
Housing (Sixth Session 1991) E/1992/23; and General Comment No. 12, The Right to Adequate food (Twentieth 
Session 1999) E/C.12/1999/5. 
19 Supra note 17.  For analysis of the HRBA to disaster management see also: Walter Kalin, A Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Building Resilience to Natural Disasters (June 2011) (available 
at https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-human-rights-based-approach-to-building-resilience-to-natural-disasters/); 
and Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, A Human Rights-Based Vulnerability Paradigm: Lessons from the Case of  Displaced 
Women in Post-Quake Haiti, in Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Disasters, Chapter 18 (Sommario E. et 
Al. (eds.) (Mar. 2018). 
4
the satisfaction of disaster victims’ protection needs through implementation of their human 
rights.  The HRBA to disaster management is disaster victim-centered and constitutes a powerful 
reminder that disaster victims are right-holders and that those who deliver disaster assistance 
should treat them as such. 
3. How Implementation of the HRBA to Disaster Management Would have Minimized 
Loss of Lives in Puerto Rico 
The HRBA to disaster management is an operational and conceptual framework that is not new 
to the U.S.  The UN Human Rights Committee analyzed the U.S.’s second and third periodic 
reports on the implementation of the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
2006,20 and made important recommendations on how to ensure that the recovery from 
Hurricane Katrina and disaster management in general were buttressed by human rights norms 
and principles binding on the U.S.21  One of these recommendations concerned the far-reaching 
prohibition of discrimination, based on certain internationally recognized grounds, “in law or in 
fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities,”22 as set out in Article 26 of the 
UN Covenant.  Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the U.S. increase, “[i]n the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina . . . its efforts to ensure that the rights of the poor . . . [were] fully 
taken into consideration in the reconstruction plans with regard to access to . . . 
healthcare.”23  The Committee’s recommendation can be interpreted as suggesting that U.S. 
disaster management strategies, in order to comply with Article 26, generally must not neglect 
disaster victims’ domestic rights with regard to access to health care.  Furthermore, any neglect 
of rights cannot be based on any of the internationally proscribed grounds of discrimination: 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth, or other status. 
The closest clarification of what a disaster-affected State could concretely do to guarantee 
disaster victims’ rights with regard to access to health care under Article 26 of the above UN 
Covenant is contained in the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee Operational Guidelines on 
the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters.24  The guidelines were prepared in 
2011 and help understand how to implement provisions contained in UN Human Rights treaties 
in natural disaster settings.  Guideline B.2.5 on the right to health states that competent 
authorities should plan health interventions so as to provide health care timely and without 
discrimination, by giving priority consideration to: disaster-affected persons requiring medical 
attention because of pre-existing medical conditions; disaster victims who have developed 
 
20 The US ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992 and is required, by virtue of Article 40 of the 
Covenant, to submit to the Human Rights Committee periodic reports on measures adopted to give effect to the 
Covenant rights domestically.  More information on how the Human Rights Committee monitors compliance with 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by States that have adhered to it is available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx. 
21 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Second and Third Periodic Reports of the USA, 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, para. 26 (Dec. 2006). 
22 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination (Nov. 10, 1989) HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 
(Vol. I), para. 12. 
23 Supra note 21. 
24 The guidelines are available  at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IDPersons/OperationalGuidelines_IDP.pdf. 
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medical conditions as a result of the impact of a natural disaster; and disaster victims who have 
developed medical problems during the overall humanitarian response.25  
In its management of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, the U.S. should not have overlooked the 
recommendation of the Human Rights Committee.  The U.S. should have implemented the 
HRBA to disaster management embedded in the recommendation read together with Operational 
Guideline B.2.5.  Implementing the HRBA to disaster management would have made the U.S. 
more mindful of the various health needs that Hurricane Maria victims were likely to have in the 
aftermath of the disaster, and would have paved the way to the realization of these persons’ 
domestic rights relevant to access to health care.  This approach would have made competent 
authorities strive for early and well-thought-out planning of arrangements, including 
coordination arrangements, for the timely provision of health care by all the providers involved 
in the recovery from Hurricane Maria to all the affected persons who needed it. 
Put more simply, the implementation of the HRBA to disaster management would have 
minimized the loss of lives in the months following Hurricane Maria.  It would have avoided 
tainting the disaster management strategy in Puerto Rico by instances of prima 
facia discrimination against the residents of Puerto Rico based on their legal status as second 
class US citizens in contravention of Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Conclusions 
The HRBA to disaster management is a conceptual and operational framework that if duly 
implemented can radically change the way in which competent governmental authorities deal 
with disasters.  The HRBA to disaster management is tailored to the protection needs of disaster 
victims; averts the risk that some of them may be subjected to unlawful differential treatment; 
and empowers disaster victims.  Equally important, the HRBA to disaster management 
highlights, for stakeholders involved in disaster management, steps and strategies to undertake in 
order to provide timely and effective relief to all affected individuals and build resilience to 
disasters.  Implementation of the HRBA to disaster management in Puerto Rico would have 
made a difference: it would have contributed to save lives and afforded Hurricane Maria victims 
disaster assistance on an equal footing.  Lack of its implementation indicates the need for the 
U.S. to review follow-up on the UN Human Rights Committee’s recommendations on disaster 
management. The review should result in: extrapolation of lessons learned encapsulating the 
HRBA to disaster management; application of the lessons to future disaster settings; and, more 
fundamentally, a re-conceptualization of disaster risk reduction, preparedness, response, and 






The United States Erodes Human Rights 
with Withdrawal from Human Rights 
Council 
August 1, 2018 
by Andrew Johnson 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) was created in 2006 by the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251. The purpose of the HRC is to develop friendly relations among 
nations and to build respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination. 
Furthermore, the HRC upholds the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and other 
international human rights instruments. Forty-seven countries are elected to the HRC for three-
year terms. Each country is elected by a secret ballot with a majority of members in the General 
Assembly to ensure impartiality and equal representation of the UN Member States. 
Moreover, the HRC examines the human rights record of every country that is a member to the 
UN. In 2017, the states receiving the most recommendations to remedy their human rights 
violations were China, Iran, Egypt, North Korea, and Vietnam. In addition to examining every 
country, the HRC sends independent investigators to address specific situations. The two most 
recent inquiries were in Syria and South Sudan in 2017. 
On June 19, 2018, the United States became the first country to withdraw from the HRC since its 
formation. The withdrawal is unprecedented, and its repercussions will detrimentally affect the 
protection of human rights around the world. The main reason for the withdrawal cited by the 
U.S. Ambassador to the UN was that the HRC is biased against Israel. The HRC focuses its 
investigations globally, not solely on Israel. However, it investigates Israel because it is obliged 
to under its mandate, not because of an anti-Israel bias like the U.S. claims. 
The U.S. also claims the council is biased and hypocritical since some of the countries that have 
been elected have also committed human rights violations. The HRC has passed many 
resolutions that condemn Israel’s conduct in Palestine as human rights violations. Although the 
Israel-Palestine conflict receives a lot of scrutiny, the HRC has also passed resolutions 
condemning North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan, and many others. The council focuses on all UN 
member countries, ensuring that they uphold human rights. As an elected member of the council, 
the U.S. has a high standard to meet to protect human rights. While there may be flaws in the 
organization, shrinking backwards into a policy of isolationism is not a productive response that 
will create solutions. 
Moreover, the U.S. is not upholding the commitments it made when it submitted its bid to be 
elected. Members of the HRC are required, under paragraph nine of GA resolution 60/251, to 
uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights. Additionally, 
in paragraph nine the U.S. is obliged to fully cooperate with the council during its membership. 
In withdrawing its influence and support, the U.S. is neither protecting nor promoting human 
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rights. It is not cooperating with the council, even though its function is to serve as a forum for 
states to address issues related to human rights. 
The U.S. is not the only country that does not meet the criteria delineated in paragraph nine. 
According to Freedom House’s annual ratings, at least twenty-three percent of states on the HRC 
are rated as “not free.” But the U.S. is the only country that has stepped away from the body 
entirely, and its absence will only allow powerful countries with poor human rights records more 
influence. It is a gift of power to authoritative regimes that will use their influence to further 
undermine human rights and to refuse to fix any systemic flaws in the HRC. 
The United States’ withdrawal from the HRC is not a death knell for human rights. The major 
human rights treaties like the UDHR and the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) are binding customary international law. The U.S. is required by those treaties to 
uphold and respect human rights with its own citizens and extraterritorially. By quitting its 
commitments to the HRC, the U.S. not taking all measures to uphold and protect human rights. 
If the U.S. truly wanted to address the problems within the HRC, it would commit to diplomacy 
and cooperation. The U.S. should encourage more countries to improve their human rights 
protections and to run for election, so that the HRC is not overcrowded with large, powerful 
countries. Furthermore, it should use the HRC as a forum to cooperate with other world leaders 
to create sustainable solutions to human rights issues, while also focusing internally to ensure it 
meets the criteria for membership as well. By setting a precedence of cooperation and self-
accountability, a renewed model for human rights protection could be possible. Isolationism 
cannot be the answer; it is the time for faith in international cooperation. 
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Closing the Book on the Ríos Montt 
Guatemala Genocide Trial  
August 6, 2018 
by William Vazquez 
On May 10, 2013, a historic moment in international criminal justice occurred. General José 
Efraín Ríos Montt, de facto President of Guatemala who rose to power through a military coup 
d’etat in March 1982 and was deposed in August 1983, became the first head of state to be 
convicted for genocide in a national court. After less than two months of trial, the Guatemalan 
High Impact Court “A” found General Ríos Montt guilty of genocide and crimes against 
humanity committed against Guatemala’s indigenous Maya Ixil people. Specifically, the court 
found that Ríos Montt had command responsibility and “full knowledge of what was 
happening,” yet did nothing to prevent the murder of 1,771 Ixiles; the forcible displacement of 
29,000; sexual violence against at least nine individuals; and various cases of torture. He was 
sentenced to a combined total of eighty years in prison for his crimes while his codefendant, José 
Mauricio Rodríguez Sánchez, his former chief of military intelligence, was acquitted of all 
charges. 
This historic moment was quickly undercut when, on May 20, 2013, Guatemala's Constitutional 
Court overturned Ríos Montt’s conviction and “reset” his trial to an earlier date. The trial’s reset 
resulted from his defense team’s arguments that Ríos Montt’s rights had been violated when his 
attorney was expelled early in the trial and that the head judge should have recused herself. Some 
suspect that outside factors, including pressure from Guatemalan business elites and sectors of 
the Guatemalan military, went into this decision. A different tribunal, High Risk Tribunal “B,” 
set a new trial date for January 5, 2015, but the trial was suspended after one judge recused 
herself from the trial over doubts about her impartiality because of her 2004 thesis on genocide. 
On July 8, 2015, Ríos Montt was found mentally incapable of standing trial, with doctors 
claiming that he was unable to understand any charges against him. Although the court found 
that Ríos Montt’s diagnosed dementia rendered him incapable of facing a regular trial, 
Guatemalan law allowed for him to still be prosecuted. Thus, the court decided to go forward 
with the trial—one that would not be open to the public, not require Ríos Montt to be present, 
and not result in a punishment for him even if found guilty.  Yet the trial was again interrupted 
after an appeals court found that the proceedings were illegal under Guatemalan law because 
codefendant Rodríguez Sánchez’s trial was required to be open and public. The High Risk 
Tribunal B finally decided that the trial of Ríos Montt and Rodríguez Sánchez would resume on 
October 13, 2017, but that they would be prosecuted separately and concurrently. In addition, 
another court determined that Ríos Montt should also stand trial for genocide and crimes against 
humanity in relation to the 1982 massacre at Las Dos Erres in which two hundred people were 
killed. Before his new trial could fully proceed, Ríos Montt died of a heart attack on April 1, 
2018.  
Despite his death, Ríos Montt’s case has important implications for transitional justice and 
international law as a whole. It showed that national courts are capable of successfully 
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prosecuting and convicting heads of state for crimes against humanity and for genocide. In light 
of the ongoing negotiations on a potential international treaty on crimes against humanity, the 
history of his trial can provide both a positive example to other countries about how a national 
court can incorporate crimes against humanity into their criminal code and hold even the highest 
officials accountable as well as a cautionary tale about the challenges that can arise in doing so, 
including delays, intimidation of judicial actors, and the struggle of maintaining a post-conflict 
peace. It and other cases related to Guatemala’s internal conflict showed that domestic, foreign, 
and international courts can positively reinforce one another in enforcing justice, reducing 
impunity, and promoting and protecting human rights.  
Most importantly, however, Ríos Montt’s trial serves as an example of justice for victims even 
when no final conviction was reached. To some his death without a final conviction, like those of 
former leaders Slobodan Milošević and Augusto Pinochet, meant that he died free and with 
impunity. However, numerous Guatemalan voices reject this idea. Former Guatemalan Attorney 
General, Claudia Paz y Paz, tweeted that Ríos Montt “died facing justice.” The Association for 
Justice and Reconciliation as well as victims and survivors of the genocide in Guatemala made 
clear that, for them, the original May 10, 2013 sentence was valid: “Ríos Montt died under house 
arrest, having been convicted . . . He died guilty, facing a second trial. History will remember 
him that way.” 
Even though Ríos Montt is gone, proceedings against Rodríguez Sánchez and others accused of 
violations committed during Guatemala’s internal conflict continue, leaving open an opportunity 
for a final resolution for victims, judicial actors, and all of Guatemala. 
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Means to an End: Border Separations Put 
Children’s Mental Health on the Line  
August 9, 2018 
by Ridhi Shetty 
Soon after the current administration announced a zero-tolerance policy toward people illegally 
entering the United States from Mexico, the policy resulted in over two thousand undocumented 
children being detained separately from their parents since April 2018. The detention of 
undocumented families is not a new phenomenon: the Obama administration held the record of 
the most deportations with over two million during former President Obama’s eight-year term. 
Each administration’s policies differed, however, in their intentions toward detained migrants’ 
well-being. 
The Obama administration’s policy reacted to a critical increase in undocumented families and 
unaccompanied children, addressing the necessity for sustainable long-term housing, the lack of 
understanding about immigration laws, and the violence driving migrants to flee their 
homelands. Despite this focus, the Border Patrol’s rampant abuse of detainees was reported from 
2009 through 2014. Federal courts ruled in 2015 that undocumented children could not be 
detained for longer than a twenty-day period, so their families would need to be released 
together. The Trump administration’s policy—possibly implemented as far back as October of 
2016—was to refer adult migrants for criminal prosecution, sending them to federal jails where 
children cannot be held. In the meantime, the Department of Health and Human Services was 
responsible for caring for separated children, but poor coordination between agencies left no 
system to reunite families. 
The Trump administration’s policy has been scrutinized worldwide—the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein cited Dr. Colleen Kraft, president of the 
American Association of Pediatrics, in condemning the policy as “government-sanctioned child 
abuse.” Based on her visit to border detention centers after the policy’s implementation, Dr. 
Kraft asserted that the stress of family separation could “disrupt a child’s brain architecture and 
affect his or her short- and long-term health,” leaving them “susceptible to learning deficits and 
chronic conditions such as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and even heart disease.” 
The American College of Physicians and the American Psychiatric Association agree that family 
separation causes negative health impacts—including anxiety, developmental delays, and 
changes in bodily functions—that will persist for the rest of these children’s lives. The effects are 
evidenced in public hospitals and clinics where children are now being treated for physical and 
mental illnesses resulting from the border separations. 
By enforcing a policy that causes mental illness in children, the current administration violates 
multiple human rights treaties to which it is a party, specifically as they pertain to children’s 
mental health. Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person…punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed…or for any reason based on discrimination” when 
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inflicted by or with the consent of “a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity,” unless the pain only arises incident to lawful sanctions. Though administration 
officials claim that separating undocumented families is lawful, the border separation amounts to 
torture for children ranging from infancy to the age of seventeen. The practice of separating 
children from their undocumented parents does not strictly serve to enforce lawful sanctions, as 
demonstrated by the absence of such a practice under previous administrations. 
Additionally, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
guarantees the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Article 3 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child further requires that all actions concerning children by 
public institutions and authorities be taken with the best interests of the children’s well-being and 
be in compliance with the standards enforced by competent authorities to preserve the children’s 
health. Article 9 requires that children are not separated from their parents against their will 
unless separation is necessary for children’s best interests, that children have the right to 
maintain personal relations and direct contact with separated parents, and that separated children 
and parents be provided information regarding each other’s whereabouts upon request. Article 24 
requires effective and appropriate measures to abolish practices that prejudice children’s health. 
Technically, President Trump’s executive order in June discontinued measures that resulted in 
family separation, but the administration has failed to meet a federal judge’s July 26 deadline to 
reunite families, with over seven hundred children remaining in government custody. The delay 
is attributed to several factors, including deported parents trying to allow their children to remain 
in the United States; detained parents being coerced and misled into signing away reunification 
rights; and ongoing trauma deterring interviews with parents and children. Thus, recovery down 
the road remains bleak for these children, and the Trump administration may face ramifications 
specifically for the human rights violations arising from its act of aggressively and purposefully 
compromising children’s mental health. 
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AMLO and Ayotzinapa: A Renewal for the 
Rule of Law in Mexico?  
August 10, 2018 
by Ali Boyd 
The Hague may be the legal capital of the world, but Latin America is undoubtedly the epicenter. 
The Netherlands boasts an unparalleled number of institutions ranging from the International 
Criminal Court to a variety of hybrid tribunals, but Latin America has been at the center of a 
renewal of accountability efforts. In a region synonymous with impunity, countries such as 
Guatemala are leading the “justice cascade,” a growing trend that utilizes trials in domestic 
courts to prosecute grave human rights abuses.1 Instead of extraditing perpetrators to await a 
lengthy and costly trial in the Netherlands, former dictators and high-ranking military officials 
like Rios Montt are facing the rule of law in their home country. 
With the July 1 electoral victory of the Morena party, Mexico is now squarely in the center of 
these accountability efforts. As the former mayor of Mexico City and third time presidential 
contender, Mexicans knew their candidate well. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, or “AMLO,” 
built his success on a campaign that promised a change from the status quo: a break with years of 
fighting a War on Drugs that has produced only staggering violence with a homicide rate that 
rivals a war zone.2  
No case is more emblematic of the failed War on Drugs than that of Ayotzinapa.3 The 
disappearance of forty-three students from Iguala, Guerrero reflects the larger crisis of a 
systematic practice of enforced disappearance. In a country that obfuscates names and numbers 
by refusing to release accurate statistics, numbers matter. While the forty-three Ayotzinapa 
students are just a fraction of the 33,125 recorded disappearances in Mexico, the case has 
garnered the world’s attention as it ricochets throughout domestic courts, the regional Inter-
American Human Rights system, and even at the universal level with the involvement of various 
agencies within the United Nations.4  
Though the crime occurred almost four years ago, Ayotzinapa is deeply entrenched in the body 
politic. AMLO’s victory, coupled with an unexpected ruling from a Mexican court, has offered 
renewed hope for the rule of law in Mexico. The night of the presidential election, Ayotzinapa 
chants could be heard on the streets as people waited for poll numbers and precinct reports. The 
rallying cry of “vivos se los llevaron, vivos los queremos” (they were taken alive, we want them 
 
1 Micheline Ishay, Kathryn Sikkink’s The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World 
Politics, Wash. Post, (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/kathryn-sikkinks-the-
justice-cascade-how-human-rights-prosecutions-are-changing-world-
politics/2011/08/22/gIQAxk7M4L_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ad5411abbb7b. 
2 Azam Ahmed, Mexico’s Deadliest Town. Mexico’s Deadliest Year., N.Y. Times, (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/world/americas/mexicos-drug-killings.html. 
3 See Francisco Goldman, The Tragedy That Changed Mexico Forever, N.Y. Times, (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/opinion/ayotzinapa-mexico-students-disappeared.html. 
4 Datacívica: Más datos para más personas, https://personasdesaparecidas.org.mx/db/db (last visited July 27, 2018). 
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back alive), has finally been translated into legal action. For the first time in years, the rule of 
law could yield some substantial change. 
Just twenty-seven days before the election, the First Collegiate Tribunal of the Nineteenth Circuit 
issued a sentence that explicitly condemned the use of torture and criticized the lack of 
impartiality of the Attorney General’s office.5 The Ayotzinapa case would be complex for any 
judicial system. However, the context of the litigation has ensured a plethora of human rights 
abuses. Foundational to this litigation has been the right to truth. The court reaffirmed the 
fundamental right to truth as an internationally recognized right of the victim. Citing Article 1.1, 
8, and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the court highlights the essential role of 
the right to truth in disappearance cases and reminds the state of its obligations to ensure that 
victims have access to a factual account of what occurred on the night of September 26.6
 
Most 
stunningly, the Ayotzinapa sentence concludes by ordering the establishment of a Special 
Commission for Truth and Justice to rectify a legal process that has not been “independent nor 
impartial.”7  
The establishment of an Ayotzinapa truth commission is historic because it represents the 
evolution of a case many feared would be stagnant for years to come. As reiterated by Centro 
Prodh, the civil society organization representing the victims, a domestic court called on its own 
government to recognize the right to truth after the government contradicted reports by the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, and the 
Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts from the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights.8 
In just one example of the last four years, the outgoing PRI administration allowed the leading 
transitional justice practitioners to conduct an investigation in Mexico, but after the  
Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts released a report that disagreed with Mexican 
officials, the experts were impugned in the press and spied on by the government.9 In contrast, 
the president elect addressed Ayotzinapa head on, featuring the case on his campaign website 
 
5 Francisco Goldman, The Tragedy That Changed Mexico Forever, N.Y. Times, (June 22, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/opinion/ayotzinapa-mexico-students-disappeared.html. 




7 See id. at 561, 627; Francisco Goldman, The Tragedy That Changed Mexico Forever, N.Y. Times, (June 22, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/opinion/ayotzinapa-mexico-students-disappeared.html. 
8 Press Release, Historic Ruling in the Ayotzinapa Case, Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez, 
A.C. (Centro Prodh), (June 4, 2018), http://centroprodh.org.mx/en/?p=869; Daniella Burgi-Palomino, LAWGEF 
Supports Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team Report Refuting Cocula Trash Dump Theory in Ayotzinapa Case, 
Latin Am. Working Grp., (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69-general/1577-lawgef-
supports-argentine-forensic-anthropology-team-report-refuting-cocula-trash-dump-theory-in-ayotzinapa-case; 
Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (IGIE), Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Ayotzinapa Report: Research and 
initial conclusions of the disappearances and homicides of the normalistas from Ayotzinapa, Summary, p. 26, (Sept. 
6, 2015), http://media.wix.com/ugd/3a9f6f_e1df5a84680a4a8a969bd45453da1e31.pdf. 
9 Azam Ahmed, Spyware in Mexico Targeted Investigators Seeking Students, N.Y. Times, (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/world/americas/mexico-missing-students-pegasus-spyware.html?ref=nyt-
es&mcid=nyt-es&subid=article; Francisco Goldman, The Tragedy That Changed Mexico Forever, N.Y. Times, 
(June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/opinion/ayotzinapa-mexico-students-disappeared.html. 
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and promising the establishment of the Sub-Secretary of Transitional Justice, Human Rights and 
Attention to Victims.10  
Until now, the right to truth has been reduced to the mothers of the disappeared quite literally 
exhuming mass graves to find their disappeared children.11 Amidst a 98% impunity rate, too 
often it is the family members who are on the frontlines of these investigations.12 In a country 
with fragile institutions and a dearth of political will, transitional justice remains elusive. And 
yet, the imminent AMLO administration offers victims a sign of hope. Conceivably, this historic 
summer will come to represent a sea change for accountability: one in which the strategy of 
filing cases before the International Criminal Court or the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights will become secondary, and domestic judicial institutions will instead lead the way for 
rule of law reform in Mexico. 
 
 
10 Campaign Website of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Ayotzinapa, https://lopezobrador.org.mx/temas/ayotzinapa/ 
(last visited July 27, 2018); Martha Pskowski, The Radical Amnesty Plan of Mexico’s Next President, New 
Republic, (July 2, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/149508/radical-amnesty-plan-mexicos-next-president. 
11 Ioan Grillo, The Paradox of Mexico’s Mass Graves, N.Y. Times, (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/opinion/mexico-mass-grave-drug-cartel.html. 
12 The Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade, Mexico’s New Fiscalía: A Way Out of Corruption and 
Impunity, (Nov. 20, 2017), https://create.org/news/mexicos-new-fiscalia-way-corruption-impunity/. 
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International Aid—Providing More than Just 
Human Rights  
August 14, 2018 
by Abby Allardice 
Many people believe that international aid is an idea steeped in human rights and humanitarian 
lore. It is true that international aid lifts up the most impoverished and vulnerable people in 
society, but this is a very narrow idea of what international aid can accomplish. The fight against 
global poverty has evolved into not just one of providing basic human rights and necessities, but 
more importantly, one of national security. Impoverished states can explode in violence 
overnight, governments can collapse and throw countries into chaos, and alienated and desperate 
people can overthrow the rule of law. States affected by conflict can quickly devolve into 
breeding grounds for environmental devastation, human trafficking, spreading of disease, and—
most importantly—terrorism. By serving disenfranchised people, helping to rebuild 
communities, and working to create stability around the globe, the United States enhances its 
influence in the global community while also protecting its domestic and national security 
interests. 
In fact, the conflicts in Syria and Africa have led to an overall decline in global peace, making 
2018 the tenth consecutive year of deterioration of world peace. These past ten years defy a trend 
of increasing stability and peace that stretches back to the end of World War II. The Global 
Peace Index blames a steep rise in terrorism, the impact of violence stemming from civil wars, 
and the number of refugees as key contributors to the decline in global peace. These factors 
result from a lack of governance, stability, and the pillars of peace such as social inclusion, 
transparency, and distribution of resources. However, it is important to note that the study also 
points out that countries can bounce back from war, given the opportunity. By using U.S. 
agencies such as USAID, the State Department, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to 
help countries get back on their feet, international aid can stem violence, curb corruption, 
empower citizens, and ultimately lead to stability. 
In the face of a weak foreign assistance structure and civilian capacity, the military must often 
step into an oversight and managerial role. In fact, from 2002 through 2005, the Department of 
Defense significantly expanded its direct provision of foreign assistance in weak and failing 
states. By placing the burden on the military to help solve international strife, it taxes an already 
overburdened organization and places it in a role it was never equipped to handle. Having 
soldiers instead of aid workers on the ground can strain not only the mission, but also the 
relationship between the citizens and the military who are trying to help. After all, citizens would 
feel more empowered towards maintaining peace if aid organizations help them rebuild their 
towns and cities after violence than if a foreign military takes control. 
Furthermore, civil war often creates an environment where terrorism can thrive. Although there 
are an infinite number of factors as to why someone might join a jihadist group, war acts as a 
definite pull factor. As seen in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, and many more countries, 
conflicts often either birth terrorist movements or strengthen existing ones. ISIS often 
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successfully captured territory where the Syrian government was weak or non-existent, using the 
void left by the government to establish itself as a legitimate alternative for the Syrian people. 
Using the military in this gap-filling tendency in foreign interventions would not only tax an 
overstretched military by having it play a role it was not trained to undertake, but would also 
serve to undermine investments in civilian capacity building. 
Instead, it would be more prudent for our national security strategy to include more foreign aid 
and collaborations with international aid agencies to ensure that peace can be more than a pipe 
dream. International aid presents numerous advantages, not just for the citizens receiving aid, but 
also for U.S. interests and solidifying alliances. For example, following the deadly bombings in 
Tanzania in 1998, where U.S. embassies were destroyed and lives were lost, USAID came in and 
helped the Tanzanians rebuild. The Ambassador of Tanzania believed that the work that USAID 
performed and the compassion they showed towards the Tanzanian people was crucial in 
building the alliance the U.S. enjoys to this day. 
With hard power being spread increasingly thinner among states and non-state actors like ISIS, 
the U.S. needs a national security strategy that recognizes and embraces the concept of aid over 
bullets and takes a more humanitarian approach to aiding our fellow man. By focusing on 
international aid, it can help alleviate some of the drivers of insecurity and desperation. Not only 
does helping the poor gain access to medicine, shelter, food, education, and opportunity help 
Americans sleep better at night, but it also allows the U.S. to reinforce its influence worldwide, 
protect its citizens, and create a safer global network. 
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One Year Later, Arpaio’s Pardon Still 
Constitutes a Violation of International Law  
August 25, 2018 
by Santiago Martinez-Neira & Alan Vogelfanger 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 25, 2017, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, pardoned Joseph Arpaio, 
the former sheriff or Maricopa County.1 Arpaio was found guilty of criminal contempt2 by a U.S. 
District Court in July 2017 for defying a court order from May 2013 that ordered him to stop 
racially profiling Hispanics.3  
Arpaio has a long history in law enforcement. He served in the U.S. Army, in the Las Vegas and 
Washington D.C. Police Departments, and as a Special Agent for the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).4 In 1992, he was elected Sheriff of Maricopa County in Arizona. Not 
long after, he coined himself as “America’s toughest sheriff.”5 As sheriff, Arpaio’s practices 
included stopping cars and detaining drivers simply because they looked Hispanic. Additionally, 
many Hispanics deprived of liberty were subjected to humiliation and cruel treatment while in 
prison,6 including forcing inmates to wear pink underwear, pink handcuffs, and sleeping on pink 
sheets.7 He publicly acknowledged that he did this because he knew that pink was especially 
shameful to Hispanics, in light of their concept of manhood.8 To this day, taxpayers have spent 
more than 70 million dollars in reparations for Arpaio’s behavior but no criminal action was 
 
1 White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2017, August 25), President Trump Pardons Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 
available on https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/president-trump-pardons-sheriff-joe-arpaio, 
last visited on 7/13/2018. 
2 United States District Court for the District of Arizona, U.S.A. v. Arpaio, Senior Judge Susan Bolton, 31 July 
2017. 
3 United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, District Judge Murray Snow, 
24 May 2013. 
4 White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2017, August 25), President Trump Pardons Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 
available on https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/president-trump-pardons-sheriff-joe-arpaio, 
last visited on 7/13/2018. 
5 BBC (2017, August 26), Joe Arpaio: Life as 'America's toughest sheriff', available on 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41015549, last visited on 7/13/2018. 
6 Mettler, Katie (2017, April 5), New Sheriff in town to close Joe Arpaio’s outdoor Tent City jail, of pink underwear 
fame, available on https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/05/new-sheriff-in-town-to-
close-joe-arpaios-outdoor-tent-city-jail-of-pink-underwear-fame/?utm_term=.4fbe970c6bd1, last visited 
on 7/13/2018. 
7 Id. 
8 Mak, Tim (2014, April 8), Arizona’s Tent City Jail: Where prisoners wear pink underwear, eat meatless meals and 
swelter in the 120-degree heat, available on http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/arizonas-tent-city-jail-where-
prisoners-wear-pink-underwear-eat-meatless-meals-and-swelter-in-the-120-degree-heat/article/2546924, last visited 
on 7/13/2018; and video Salvados: ‘Le daría un abrazo pero tengo la espalda mojada’, available on 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x07HU0sxxeo&t=3s, last visited on 7/13/2018. 
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brought against him.9 Although he was compelled by a Federal Court to stop the racial profiling 
of Hispanics, Arpaio continued the discriminatory practice, which resulted in the decision to hold 
him in contempt. 
Donald Trump’s pardon of Arpaio was highly criticized.10 Some scholars and politicians argued 
that even though the power to pardon was broadly defined in the Constitution, the use of this 
presidential privilege, in the context of the charges against Arpaio, was unconstitutional.11 
Although the pardon power is unquestionably a presidential prerogative, this article will argue 
that regardless of whether or not it is constitutional under U.S. law, the pardoning of Arpaio 
violates international law principles and norms. President Trump’s decision constitutes a human 
rights violation because pardons are not above international law and, therefore, are limited by the 
obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish grave human rights violations and to provide an 
appropriate reparation to victims. In particular, since the matter centers around the principle of 
non-discrimination, one of the core issues of international human rights law, the pardon in 
question cannot be accepted if its practical consequence is the lack of an effective remedy for 
those affected by Arpaio’s practices. 
II. THE UNITED STATES’ OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 
June 8, 1992. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), which is the designated body to interpret 
the ICCPR and whose decisions constitute authoritative guidance, has established that a failure to 
take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate, or redress 
harm would give rise to a violation by State Parties.12 Article 2.3.a demands that State Parties 
“ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy.” Therefore, the treaty demands that “in addition to effective protection of 
Covenant rights State Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective 
remedies to vindicate those rights.”13  
The HRC requires “appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of 
rights violations under domestic law”14 and established that a failure by a State Party to 
 
9 Cassidi, Megan (2017, August 17), Taxpayer tab up to $70M in Joe Arpaio racial-profiling case, available on 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2017/08/17/taxpayer-tab-up-70-m-joe-arpaio-racial-profiling-
case/576878001/, last visited on 7/13/2018. 
10 Tribe, Laurence; Fein, Robert (2017, September 18), Trump’s pardon of Arpaio can — and should — be 
overturned, available on https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-presidential-pardon-power-is-not-
absolute/2017/09/18/09d3497c-9ca5-11e7-9083-fbfddf6804c2_story.html?utm_term=.19582877245a, last visited 
on 7/13/2018. 
11 Cfr. Proposed Memorandum of Amici Curiae from certain members of the Congress in opposition to defendant’s 
motion for vacatur and dismissal with prejudice (2017, September 27); Proposed Memorandum of Amici Curiae 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael E. Tigar, and Jane B. Tigar (2017, September 11); and Tsai, Robert (2017, September 
1), The Troubling Sherriffs’ Movement That Joe Arpaio Supports, available on 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/01/joe-arpaio-pardon-sheriffs-movement-215566, last visited 
on 7/13/2018. 
12 Cfr. HRC, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, par. 8. 
13 Id., par. 15. 
14 Id. 
19
investigate allegations of violations of human rights could give rise to a breach of the ICCPR.15 
To fulfill this obligation, State Parties must ensure that those responsible for violating the rights 
enshrined in the Covenant are brought to justice; failure to investigate or to bring to justice 
perpetrators of such violations could give rise to a breach of the Covenant.16 Finally, the HRC 
also stated that where public officials or State agents have violated the Covenant, the State 
Parties concerned may not relieve perpetrators from personal responsibility, as has occurred with 
some amnesties or prior legal immunities and indemnities.17  
Furthermore, the United States also ratified the Charter of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) on June 19, 1951. As a result, the United States is subject to the obligations enumerated in 
the treaty and in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American 
Declaration) because, for OAS member States, the American Declaration outlines the 
commitments and obligations of the Charter.18 Additionally, most of the core articles of the 
American Declaration are customary international law, including the right to liberty, due process, 
and a fair trial.19 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has affirmed that 
States must refrain from “supporting, tolerating or acquiescing in acts or omissions that 
contravene their human rights commitments.”20 Therefore, States must not only refrain from 
committing human rights violations but must adopt affirmative measures to guarantee that the 
individuals subject to their jurisdictions can exercise and enjoy the rights contained in the 
American Declaration.21  
The State’s duty to implement human rights obligations in practice encompasses preventing, 
responding, punishing, and providing remedies to the acts that constitute a violation.22 This duty 
is known as the principle of due diligence. Indeed, establishing measures that eliminate 
responsibility for human rights violations is inadmissible when the objective is to prevent the 
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations.23  
As the IACHR conveyed in the Gustavo Carranza vs. Argentina case, a pardon can constitute an 
infringement of the American Declaration if it results in judicial inaction in the face of a manifest 
violation of human rights,24 or if the effects of the pardon violate the human rights recognized in 
the Declaration.25 In Carranza, a former Argentinean Judge who was removed by the military 
government tried to seek the nullification of the decision. However, the National Supreme Court 
of Justice adjudicated the merits of the petitioner’s claim based on the political question doctrine, 
 
15 Id. 
16 Id., para. 18. 
17 Cfr. HRC, General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment), 10 March 1992, p. 15; and General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, par. 18. 
18 Cfr. IACHR, James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton v. United States, Resolution 3/87, Case 9.647, 22 September 
1987, par. 49; Universalization of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 14 August 2014, par. 50; Victor 
Saldaño v. United States, Report No. 24/17, Case 12.254, 18 March 2017, par. 76. 
19 Cfr. IACHR, Lares-Reyes v. United States, Report 19/02, Case 12.379, 27 February 2002, par. 46. 
20 IACHR, Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Report No. 80/11, Case 12.626, 21 July 2011, par. 116. 
21 Ibid, par. 118. 
22 Ibid, par. 119. 
23 IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, 14 March 2001, par. 41. 
24 See IACHR, Carranza v. Argentina, Report No. 30/97, Case 10.087, 30 September 1997, par. 50. 
25 Ibid, par. 63. 
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which impeded a substantial analysis of the situation. The IACHR decided that, by not providing 
the Judge with an appropriate remedy, Argentina committed a violation of the right to a fair trial 
and the right to judicial protection. The Commission also stated that the political question 
doctrine could not be used to deprive someone from an effective remedy. Moreover, the 
Commission has referenced the harmful effects of impunity, stating that “when the perpetrators 
are not held to account . . . the impunity confirms that such violence and discrimination is 
acceptable, thereby fueling its perpetuation.”26  
III. ARPAIO’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION  
The principle of non-discrimination is at the core of international law. In fact, the international 
legal order stands, among others, on this principle, which today belongs to the category of jus 
cogens norms.27 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, this means that 
it is a peremptory norm of general international law that is “accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.”28 States must refrain from taking actions or adopting measures that 
discriminate, directly or indirectly, against any person or group of persons under their 
jurisdiction. Additionally, States must not tolerate any norm or act that contradicts this principle; 
on the contrary, they must take actions to abolish the legal effects of any norm, de facto or de 
jure, that tolerate or promote discrimination of any type. 
Racial profiling constitutes a serious violation of the principle of non-discrimination, both at the 
domestic and international levels. The practice known as “driving while Latino”29 was frequently 
employed by former sheriff Arpaio during his tenure. Under this practice, individuals were 
stopped and detained solely because they looked like they had Hispanic origins. Using racial 
criteria to identify and detain people who might not have a regular migratory status under the 
guise of enforcing driving infractions is highly discriminatory and unacceptable on any legal 
grounds. 
Indeed, in May 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ordered Arpaio 
to stop, 1) detaining, holding, or arresting Hispanic occupants of vehicles in Maricopa County 
based only on the belief, however reasonable, that such persons are in the country without 
authorization; 2) using race or Hispanic ancestry as a factor in determining whether to stop any 
vehicle in Maricopa County with a Hispanic occupant; and 3) using race or Hispanic ancestry as 
 
26 IACHR, The situation of the rights of women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico: the right to be free from violence and 
discrimination, 3 March 2013, par. 128.  
27 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion on the juridical condition and rights of the undocumented migrants, 17 September 
2003, par. 101. 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, article 53. 
29 Stuesse, Angela (2016, September 30), Driving While Latino, available on 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/driving-while-latino_us_57ed6ce4e4b07f20daa1052f, last visited 
on 7/13/2018. 
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a factor in making law enforcement decisions with respect to whether any Hispanic occupant of a 
vehicle in Maricopa County may be in the country without authorization.30  
Arpaio violated the order resulting in a U.S. Federal Court holding him in criminal contempt. 
Senior Judge Susan Bolton, from the District Court for the District of Arizona, underscored that 
Arpaio was still detaining and arresting immigrants and that he had even challenged the judiciary 
by stating: “If they don’t like what I’m doing, get the laws changed in Washington”31; and “until 
the laws are changed my deputies will continue to enforce state and federal immigration laws.”32  
On August 25, 2017, President Donald Trump pardoned Arpaio.33 However, pardoning contempt 
for committing discriminatory actions should be considered unlawful, as the State would go from 
committing and tolerating discrimination to actively promoting it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Racial profiling is a serious violation of international human rights law. Arpaio, a U.S. law 
enforcement officer, committed these practices against the law of nations, which is binding on 
the State. He was ordered by a court to cease profiling on the basis of race, yet he continued to 
engage in these practices and was held in criminal contempt for ignoring the order. Failing to 
punish him for his actions through a pardon means that the United States is in violation of 
international law. 
The use of the presidential prerogative to issue pardons, which is recognized in article 2, section 
2, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, is not a violation of international human rights law per se. 
However, if the pardon or its effects result in a violation of any of the rights protected by the 
ICCPR and/or the American Declaration, then undoubtedly international human rights law has 
been violated. 
In the present case, the final effect of the pardon will be to: 1) preclude sentencing and 
punishment for willfully defying a court order for conduct entailing a violation of the jus cogens 
principle of non-discrimination; 2) leave the victims without an appropriate remedy; and 3) 
encourage other sheriffs to engage in these kinds of illicit practices. Since Arpaio’s actions will 
end in impunity for the lack of punishment, the situation constitutes an internationally wrongful 
act, which generates State responsibility. The pardon of the contempt implies that grave human 
rights violations will not be properly addressed. However, the true significance of the pardon is 
that it suggests that the former sheriff’s actions as a whole were non-reproachable and that the 
violations can be repeated. 
The United States has frequently been criticized by United Nations bodies for its discriminatory 
practices.34 In this sense, Arpaio’s discriminatory actions, and the failure to investigate and 
 
30 United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, District Judge Murray Snow, 
24 May 2013, p. 141-142. 
31 United States District Court for the District of Arizona, U.S.A. v. Arpaio, Senior Judge Susan Bolton, 31 July 
2017, p. 3.  
32 Ibid, p. 6. 
33 White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2017, August 25), President Trump Pardons Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 
available on https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/president-trump-pardons-sheriff-joe-arpaio, 
last visited on 7/13/2018. 
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punish them, are not isolated occurrences. For example, the HRC has recommended that the U.S. 
government implement measures to effectively combat and eliminate racial profiling by federal, 
state, and local law enforcement officials, and to expand protection against profiling on the basis 
of religion, religious appearance, or national origin.35 The Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination also expressed its concerns because of “the practice of racial profiling of 
racial or ethnic minorities by law enforcement officials, including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Transportation Security Administration, border enforcement officials, 
and local police.”36 One if its recommendations was for the United States to undertake “prompt, 
thorough, and impartial investigations into all allegations of racial profiling, surveillance, 
monitoring, and illegal intelligence-gathering; holding those responsible accountable; and 
providing effective remedies, including guarantees of non-repetition.”37 Finally, the United 
Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) recently found that “the current 
level of detention of immigrants demonstrates an excessive use of immigration-related detention 
that cannot be justified based on legitimate necessity”38 and that it has cost United States 
taxpayers “approximately $2 billion annually.”39  
In pardoning Arpaio the United States is sending the message that Arpaio’s actions were not 
wrong or reprehensible. The government is not only saying that it is acceptable to disregard a 
judicial order, but that profiling, discriminating against, and humiliating people because of their 
origin is permissible. In conclusion, this pardon jeopardizes the rule of law and the fundamental 




34 Cfr. HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the United States of America, 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23 April 2014, p. 4; CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventh to ninth 
periodic reports of the United States of America, CERD/C/USA/CO/7-9, 25 September 2014, p. 3; and GA, Report 
of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its visit to the United States of America, A/HRC/36/37/Add.2, 17 
July 2017, par. 24. 
35 Cfr. HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the United States of America, 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23 April 2014, p. 4. 
36 CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventh to ninth periodic reports of the United States of 
America, CERD/C/USA/CO/7-9, 25 September 2014, p. 3. 
37 Ibid, p. 3-4. 
38 GA, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its visit to the United States of America, 
A/HRC/36/37/Add.2, 17 July 2017, par. 31. 
39 Ibid, p. 24. 
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Brazilian Debt Bondage—Re-Defining 
Modern Day Slavery  
October 12, 2018 
by Victoria Kadous 
Debt bondage (or bonded labor) has been classified by many countries as a modern-day form of 
slavery. Debt bondage has been linked to multiple sectors such as agriculture, logging, 
construction, and domestic work. Debt bondage occurs when a person’s labor acts as a means to 
repay some form of loan. As the worker is trying to pay off their expenses the debt only becomes 
larger, leading to a never-ending cycle. 
In Brazil, the vast majority of workers in logging, ranching, deforestation, agriculture, and 
charcoal are in debt bondage. Workers are often persuaded to leave their towns to work in the 
Amazon. Without the worker's knowledge, employers then charge them for things like travel to 
the worksite and lodging at the worksite. These costs are then further enhanced by high interest 
rates creating a large debt that the laborer cannot get out of. 
In October of 2017, the Brazilian government issued a decree attempting to limit the definition of 
slave labor in order to lessen the instances in which debt bondage could be defined as slave 
labor. The proposed change would limit the definition of slave labor to instances where workers 
are restricted in movement. Under the proposed definition change, a person who is not fed, has 
no place to sleep, and makes no wages could not be classified as a slave if they were physically 
able to walk away from their place of work but chose to remain in those conditions. The 
proposed change received immediate pushback from human rights groups and was later 
retracted. 
Debt bondage as a whole has been used for centuries to control vulnerable populations through 
human, labor, and sex trafficking. These forms of trafficking have recently been labeled as 
modern-day slavery by the United Nations via the Palermo Protocol. Article 4 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights expressly states that “no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; 
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all other forms.” While the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is not binding on nations through an individual 
enforcement mechanism, it is customary international law which creates a sense of legal 
obligation to uphold the tenets of the agreement. In addition to the UDHR, Brazil has ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1992. The ICCPR is legally 
binding and is based on the UDHR. Article 8 of the ICCPR echoes the obligation under the 
UDHR by prohibiting all forms of slavery and forced labor. 
In addition to the UDHR and ICCPR, Brazil further agreed to be bound by the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) by ratifying the Convention in 1992. Article 6 of the 
ACHR explicitly states that “no one shall be subject to slavery or involuntary servitude” and that 
“no one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.” Unlike the UDHR, which was 
more of an initial foundation for international human rights recognition, the ACHR is binding on 
its signatories through a designated Commission and Court. The Commission on Human Rights 
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and Court of Human Rights hears violations and renders judgment on nations who violate the 
Convention. 
When signing the ACHR, Brazil authorized the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to have jurisdiction on all matters relating to the 
Convention indefinitely. The Convention specified that slavery and forced labor were forms of 
prohibited conduct in the signatory nations. Brazil did not attempt to reinterpret slavery or forced 
labor as defined by the Convention, only providing its alternate interpretation of Articles 43 and 
48(d) regarding site visits and procedures for investigation of violations.  Therefore, Brazil is 
legally bound by this Convention and its interpretations of slavery and forced labor.  At the core 
of defining slavery under the Convention is whether the deprivation of liberty is present absent 
any prison sentence, military service, immediate danger to the community, or civil obligation. 
Further, the Convention specifically highlights trafficking in women as a form of slavery, which 
is regularly accompanied by debt bondage of some form. Because of this link between debt 
bondage and modern-day slavery by the ACHR, its extensive usage in Brazil for labor in 




United States Immigration Policy Sinks to a 
New Low  
October 13, 2018 
by Susan Imerman 
As of May 2018, there were 25.4 million refugees living outside of their homes, desperately 
seeking safety from their war-torn nations. This unprecedented number surpasses the entire 
population of New York State and is five times greater than the population of Ireland. Out of the 
millions of refugees currently awaiting resettlement, less than 0.5% were actually resettled in the 
past year. Yet, at a time when so many are desperately seeking refuge, the Trump administration 
recently announced its plan to reduce the refugee admissions cap in the United States to a 
historical all-time low. 
The term “refugee” was first defined in the 1951 United Nations Convention which also 
established the first internationally recognized laws related to refugee admissions. Years later, 
The United States joined this global commitment to protect refugees when it signed the United 
Nations 1967 Protocol. Congress eventually incorporated the international treaty into U.S. law 
with the  Refugee Act of 1980 (the Act), providing the legal basis for today’s U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program (USRAP). Under U.S. law, the President, in consultation with Congress, 
sets a ceiling for refugee admissions each year. According to the Act, “the number of refugees 
who may be admitted ... may not exceed fifty thousand.”  However, the Act allows for an excess 
of the cap should the President deem it to be justified “by humanitarian concerns” or “national 
interest.” Although the refugee cap has fluctuated over time, since 1975, the United States has 
resettled over three million refugees, admitting 207,000 in 1980 alone. 
Until recently, the lowest annual refugee admission was 27,110 and occurred the year after 9/11. 
However in 2018, the President’s senior policy advisor, Stephen Miller, and U.S. Secretary of 
State, Mike Pompeo, advocated to decrease the cap to 25,000 refugees, the lowest in our 
country’s history. The program’s fate rests largely in the hands of Mr. Miller, a strong anti-
immigration advocate who recently gained allies due to abrupt staffing changes in the White 
House. In the past eighteen months, two of the three cabinet secretaries who pushed back on 
lowering immigration admissions—Rex Tillerson, former Secretary of State, and Elaine Duke, 
former Secretary of Homeland Security—were replaced by officials with similar political 
ideologies to Mr. Miller. Furthermore, officials at the National Security Council who previously 
opposed Mr. Miller’s efforts to slash refugee numbers, have also left or been forced out. In their 
place, two men close to Mr. Miller and who are also in favor of drastically cutting U.S. refugee 
numbers have been named to senior positions within the State Department: Andrew Veprek, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Refugees and Migration, and John Zadrozny, a policy planning 
staff member. 
The administration’s explanation for the abrupt shift in U.S. immigration policy has varied, with 
many officials citing national security concerns as a reason for the drastic cut in refugee 
numbers. White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders declared that Mr. Trump “wants 
to make sure whoever comes into the country, we know who they are, why they’re coming, and 
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that they pose no danger or threat to Americans.” Secretary Pompeo further stated that the 
reduced refugee cap “reflects our commitment to protect the most vulnerable around the world 
while prioritizing the safety and wellbeing of the American people.” 
In response to the Trump administration’s claims, there have been numerous cries of outrage 
around the international humanitarian community. Amnesty International, an NGO with the 
third-longest history in the field of international human rights, contended that the 
administration’s announcement “demonstrates another undeniable political attack against people 
who have been forced to flee their homes,” and that “[t]here is absolutely no excuse for not 
accepting more refugees in the coming year.” The International Rescue Committee further 
echoed their concerns, urging that, “The United States is not only abdicating humanitarian 
leadership and responsibility-sharing in response to the worst global displacement and refugee 
crisis since World War II, but compromising critical strategic interests and reneging on 
commitments to allies and vulnerable populations.” 
Despite the international community’s objections, the administration defends that the United 
States is still the “most generous nation in the world when it comes to protection-based 
immigration.” Regardless of the outlook, one aspect of the new refugee policy is clear: at a time 
when 68.5 million people have been forcibly displaced worldwide, the U.S. has chosen to divert 
its international commitments and reduce the admissions cap from 50,000 to its lowest point in 
the program’s almost forty-year history. The policy shift will undoubtedly have a ripple effect 
across the globe—refugees who might have formally resettled in the United States must now 
seek refuge in a new nation or risk living in limbo for the remainder of their lifetime. 
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South Carolina’s Failure to Protect Prisoners 
During Hurricane Florence Raises Human 
Rights Concerns  
October 17, 2018 
by Rachel Cundiff 
Each fall, dangerous weather conditions brought by hurricane season threaten communities in the 
southeastern part of the United States. Many of the citizens in these communities are able to take 
the safety precautions necessary to prevent the storm from bringing devastation to their lives. But 
there is one population whose ability to take shelter during the storm is entirely out of their own 
hands: the incarcerated. Prison populations are directly under the control of the state, and it is the 
state’s duty to ensure that they are safe during dangerous weather conditions. The state’s failure 
to do so raises concerns about the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment and the violation of 
the prisoners’ human rights. 
Poor treatment of prisoners during hurricanes is a recurring problem. During Hurricane Katrina, 
Louisiana prisoners were not permitted to evacuate state prisons in anticipation of the storm and 
were later forced to remain in their cells amid dangerous flooding when prison guards abandoned 
them to evacuate. Last year during Hurricane Harvey, the Texas government refused to allow for 
the evacuation of prisoners despite the treacherous storm. In September of this year, Hurricane 
Florence threatened coastal communities throughout the Carolinas. South Carolina in particular 
was faced with heavy rains, winds, and dangerous storm surges. Despite South Carolina 
Governor Henry McMaster’s order for mandatory evacuations along the coast of the state, 
accompanied by his claim that that he did not want to “risk one South Carolina life in this 
hurricane,” state officials chose not to evacuate prisons across the state even if the prisoners were 
incarcerated in mandatory evacuation zones. As a result, prisoners were forced to sustain the 
dangerous storm conditions while locked inside a confined space with virtually no opportunity to 
flee to safety. The decision of the South Carolina government raises questions about the 
treatment of South Carolina prisoners in general, the value that the South Carolina government 
places on the lives of their prisoners, and the potential human rights violations created by forcing 
them to sustain potentially life-threatening weather conditions while locked inside cells. 
South Carolina’s potential human rights violations are evident in light of both national and 
international human rights guidelines. The treatment of prisoners in the United States is subject 
to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The fact that 
prisoners continue to be protected by the Constitution from cruel and unusual punishment 
indicates that even though they have been deprived of a significant degree of freedom, they are 
still afforded liberties by the Constitution, and the state is not permitted to ignore their rights 
upon their sentencing to prison. Furthermore, in the international setting, Article 10 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that “All persons 
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity 
of the human person.” South Carolina’s decision to issue a mandatory evacuation indicates that 
the safety and well-being of many citizens was a central concern to the state. The refusal to allow 
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prisoners to join the evacuees makes clear both that South Carolina is not concerned with the 
safety and well-being of their prisoners and that they have not shown respect to the 
Constitution’s protection of this population. When considered within the context of these legal 
and ethical standards that governments are called to abide by as they control prison populations, 
South Carolina’s behavior in this situation indicates a potential constitutional violation and a 
clear human rights violation. Forcing prisoners to sustain dangerous storm conditions while 
locked inside a cell, as every other citizen outside of the prison is evacuated from the 
geographical area, is not consistent with humane and dignified treatment of prisoners. 
The impact that hurricanes have on southern communities is only going to worsen as the climate 
continues to change and severe weather patterns become more prominent. To respect the civil 
and human rights of all prisoners and thus comply with the United States Constitution and 
various international standards, governments should treat prison populations humanely when 
making preparation and safety decisions in anticipation of natural disaster. Locking citizens who 
have been convicted of crimes in cells is not cruel and unusual punishment. But locking them in 
these cells and abandoning them during potentially devastating weather conditions is cruel, 
unusual, and inhumane. 
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Matter of A-B-: What This Means for Victims 
of Domestic Violence  
October 29, 2018 
by Marcela Velarde 
Immigration authorities and courts have long struggled with whether or not victims of domestic 
and gang-based violence should qualify for asylum. One of the most difficult barriers for victims 
is establishing that they meet one of the five protected grounds for asylum, particularly 
membership in a “particular social group,” which has become considerably harder with the 
changing political climate under the Trump administration. In June 2018, Matter of A-B- 
overruled the precedential decision of Matter of A-R-C-G-, holding that women could no longer 
apply for asylum by claiming they were victims of “private criminal activity that constitutes 
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group,” thus calling into question the 
viability of domestic and gang-based violence asylum claims. 
Since August 26, 2014, immigration lawyers relied heavily on Matter of A-R-C-G- to establish 
that women fleeing domestic violence could be eligible for asylum. Matter of A-R-C-G- was the 
first case where the Board of Immigration Appeals declared “married women . . . who are unable 
to leave their relationship,” to be a cognizable particular social group. This landmark asylum 
decision arose after a Guatemalan woman, who endured physical and sexual spousal abuse for 
years, fled Guatemala and filed an asylum application, effectively demonstrating that her 
husband harmed her on the basis of her gender and status as a wife. As a result, other domestic 
violence victims were able to seek asylum by pointing to evidence that mirrored the evidence 
cited in Matter of A-R-C-G-. However, on June 11, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
overruled Matter of A-R-C-G- with Matter of A-B- by establishing that an asylum claim cannot 
be granted on “the mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain 
crimes or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime.” The Attorney General 
applied the same standard from Matter of A-R-C-G- requiring that “persecution arises on account 
of membership in a protected group,” but held that women who were victims of domestic 
violence no longer qualify broadly as a protected group. The particular social group “must exist 
independently of the harm asserted in an application for asylum,” as opposed to their inability to 
leave being defined or created by the harm. In Matter of A-B-, the respondent had claimed she 
was eligible for asylum because of her membership in the particular social group of “El 
Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have 
children in common.” 
The right to seek and enjoy asylum is affirmed in Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the United States government has ensured that this right is given effect at the 
national level by adhering to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 
Convention”) by virtue of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and approving 
The United States Refugee Act of 1980 amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
which defines “refugees” under the same guidelines as the 1951 Convention. The United States 
has also used the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees definition for 
“particular social group” and uses case law to decide what circumstances apply on a case-by-case 
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basis. However, since the United States has not ratified other international human rights treaties, 
like the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, which states that “aggravated or cumulative forms of discrimination against women 
may amount to persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention,” the international obligation to 
interpret the definition of a “refugee” in a light more favorable to women’s issues has yet to 
become binding. 
On the other hand, the United States has ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”). Victims of domestic violence or gang-related violence must establish that it is more 
likely than not that they would be tortured if they were to be returned to their country of removal. 
If they meet the threshold, then the United States is obligated to withhold or defer removal to the 
country from which they came. One challenge to this approach is that the government must be 
involved in order for CAT to apply, and while mere acquiescence might count, a person seeking 
asylum must demonstrate that the government chose to ignore the fact that someone else tried to 
torture or kill that person. Furthermore, it can be difficult to apply CAT if countries have 
proactively introduced measures to address domestic violence by ratifying international human 
rights treaties and passing domestic legislation with the aim to offer remedies to confront the 
issue. 
The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- “close[s] the door on domestic violence and 
gang-based asylum claims by those fleeing persecution from ‘private actors’,” which means 
victims should not cite or rely on Matter of A-R-C-G- anymore since claims in that case will not 
find support in Matter of A-B-. While cases on gender-based asylum should still be brought 
forward to push for a change in practice, practitioners should explore other forms of “particular 
social groups” and try to rely on claims based on the other protected groups of race, religion, 
nationality, and political opinion. However, the United States government will likely “be forced 
to address the issue of ‘gender alone’-based particular social group claims.” Additionally, the 
Attorney General’s decision stated that persecution by a nongovernmental entity met the 
standard for asylum “so long as the government was ‘unable or unwilling’ to prevent such 
persecution.” Within dicta, he seemingly heightened this burden by suggesting that asylum 
seekers must now demonstrate that their governments “condoned the behavior or demonstrated a 
complete helplessness to protect the victim” rather than just showing that the government had 
difficulty controlling the private actor. 
Under Matter of A-B-, victims can no longer expect to be granted asylum by relying on domestic 
violence and gang-based claims as stated in Matter of A-R-C-G-. While it is debated whether this 
is in violation of international human rights law standards, the situation could improve if more 
international human rights treaties are ratified by the United States, incorporated into domestic 
law, and applied effectively. For now, victims should focus their claims on other protected 
groups rather than particular social groups, even while still bringing those gender-based claims 
forward. Ultimately, immigration judges may shift again to accepting domestic violence and 
gang-based asylum claims if and when the political climate changes and they choose to interpret 
the law in a different manner. 
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Outsource Human Rights Obligations 
 
November 22, 2018 
by Victoria Kadous 
 
Nicaragua has historically been regarded as one of the safest Central American nations. This is in 
part due to low levels of corruption and homicide coupled with the fact that unrest and violence 
in Nicaragua is not as pervasive as it is in other Central American countries. As a result, 
Nicaragua has had low migration to the United States. Of the migrants that do leave Nicaragua, 
most of them are seeking better paying jobs in neighboring Costa Rica. However, this overall 
peace within Nicaragua ceased under President Daniel Ortega. 
Since April 2018, thousands of citizens have demanded Ortega’s resignation. In response to 
these outcries, Ortega dispatched police and hired para-police groups. These para-police 
groups are combinations of plainclothes police officers, the Sandinista Youth paramilitaries, and 
gang members. The use of para-police is not a new strategy. In fact several Central and South 
American countries have used para-police to suppress critics of the government. This tactic of 
outsourcing law enforcement duties to handle unrest has most notably occurred in Venezuela. In 
Venezuela, this tactic created a lot of problems because lack of government oversight resulted in 
para-police groups becoming criminal organizations rather than law enforcement personnel. 
According to Human Rights Watch, the para-police groups in Nicaragua have caused at present 
hundreds of deaths and over a thousand injuries. Despite calls from the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights to end the repression of protesters and adopt measures to stop the 
violence, the Nicaraguan government has refused to accept responsibility or take action to end 
the bloodshed. 
The killing of protestors in general is in violation of the right of life protected in Article 3 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 4 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR). Moreover, Articles 18, 19, and 20 of the UDHR protect the rights of freedom of 
thought, opinion, expression, and assembly. Similarly, Articles 13 and 15 of the ACHR solidify 
the freedom of thought and right to assemble. 
President Ortega has attempted to extract himself from responsibility by labeling the para-
military groups as foreign agitators, gangs, and citizens defending themselves. Even if that were 
true, Ortega would still have the responsibility to protect his citizens from being killed on the 
streets for exercising their right to protest. According to Article 1 of the ACHR, states are 
required to not only refrain from violating the provisions, but also to ensure that their citizens 
can exercise their rights under the ACHR. Moreover, Article 2 of the ICCPR, which Nicaragua is 
a party to, also requires states to respect and protect rights and remedy violations. 
At this point—with such widespread killing of his citizens—Ortega cannot simply disavow the 
human rights violations as the actions of foreign agitators. Nicaragua’s human rights obligations 
are universal; they do not depend solely on acts of commission, as human rights violations can 
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also be based on acts of omission such as failing to protect citizens from widespread killings. 
According to Article 1 of the ACHR, the government has the responsibility to ensure that the 
enumerated rights and freedoms are protected. By ignoring violations of rights and freedoms, the 
head of the state is effectively condoning those violations, eliminating the protections of the 
ACHR. 
Nicaragua signed and ratified the ACHR in 2006, consenting to all of its authority, including the 
competence of Article 45. Article 45 provides that the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights can “examine communications in which a 
State Party alleges another State Party has committed a violation of a human right set forth in 
this Convention.” Because of this jurisdiction, a state party may bring a complaint to the 
Commission or the Court against Nicaragua for not respecting human rights. If the Nicaraguan 
government refuses to respect the rights of its citizens, it is up to the international community to 
utilize the human rights bodies to hold Ortega and the para-police accountable for the 
fundamental human rights violations. 
 
33
Six Nations Unite in ICC Referral: A Historic 
Step Towards Justice for Venezuela’s Citizens 
 
December 5, 2018 
by Lucia Canton 
 
This past September, the leaders of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru 
made history when they came together and took the unprecedented step of requesting the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an investigation into Crimes Against Humanity 
(CAH) in Venezuela. This marked the first time in history that state parties to the ICC have 
referred a fellow member party to the Court. These six countries are urging the ICC to 
investigate CAH that were committed by the Venezuelan government since February 2014 in 
hopes that senior government officials will be held responsible for the widespread and extensive 
human rights abuses that have gone unprosecuted for years. 
Over the past eight years, under both former President Hugo Chavez and current President 
Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has regressed from a democratic nation to a nation that is falling 
victim to a growing climate of impunity, stripping its citizens of the rights they are entitled to as 
human beings. The current state of human rights in Venezuela is one of the worst in its region 
when it comes to rule of law. The nation suffers from a chilling homicide rate of approximately 
seventy-eight people killed per day (roughly one death per twenty minutes), an extreme scarcity 
of basic goods, and a violent repression of public demonstrations with government officials 
regularly arresting and torturing dissidents. In this vein, former UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Zeid Raad Al Hussein, appropriately summarized the nation’s current status, 
stating that “the rule of law is virtually absent in Venezuela.” The country has been 
experiencing severe food and medicine shortages, as well as, a growing environment of political 
oppression. Many opposition leaders have been subject to arrest and prosecution with unfair 
trials, and the government has brutally repressed peaceful protests. 
Civil society organizations and human rights defenders in Venezuela have also been subjected to 
persecution and human rights abuses by Venezuelan senior officials. Likewise, Venezuelan 
citizens have been left voiceless and exposed to life-threatening conditions under these 
catastrophic circumstances, with several individuals—including children—falling victim 
to arbitrary arrests and detentions, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and 
more. As a result, over 2.3 million Venezuelans have fled the country for their own safety, 
pouring into neighboring countries at alarming rates. As a response to the violence and 
subsequent migration, the Venezuelan government, under Nicolás Maduro, has turned a blind 
eye to this crisis and has denied its existence. Not only have senior officials in Venezuela failed 
to act on their obligation to prevent these atrocities and protect Venezuelan citizens, but they 
have also been the masterminds behind these abuses, often involved in organizing and 
committing the crimes. 
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The six countries accusing the Venezuelan governments of CAH are not alone in their assertion; 
several regional and international organizations report similar concerns. Article seven of the 
ICC’s Rome Statute defines CAH as “specific crimes committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack.” In May 
2018, the Organization of American States (OAS) provided an extensive report depicting the 
presence of several different types of CAH occurring in Venezuela since 2014. The OAS report 
detailed different types of CAH, including: rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty, widespread and systematic persecution, torture, 
and murder. After analyzing the OAS report, a Panel of Independent International Experts 
announced that these atrocities, to which Venezuelan citizens have been subjected since 
February of 2014, do in fact constitute CAH under the Rome Statute. In addition to the OAS 
report, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released 
a report finding that between July 2015 and March 2017, security forces in Venezuela killed 505 
people, including twenty-four children. In November 2017, Human Rights Watch also reported 
systematic abuses by Venezuelan security officers. Even with plenty of evidence, and extensive 
research available on the existence of these crimes, the Venezuelan government continues to 
adamantly deny the presence of these atrocities. 
The ICC jurisdiction ratione materiae extends to four international crimes: genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. The ICC has the ability to exercise 
jurisdiction over CAH under three specific circumstances: (1) when a State Party to the ICC 
refers the crimes to the Court; (2) when the UN Security Council refers the crimes to the Court; 
or (3) when the ICC prosecutor initiates a preliminary examination into the crimes. In 2000, 
Venezuela ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC, giving the Court jurisdiction over the crimes 
perpetrated in the territory and/or by the nationals of the country. Along with Venezuela, the 
referring countries, as State parties to the ICC, are able to bring this referral. Although a state 
party referral is considered a jurisdictional trigger for the ICC, the Court has never previously 
opened a case brought by one government against another, having only dealt with self-
referrals by states in the past. Furthermore, five of the countries behind the referral are 
Venezuela’s neighbors, and leaders in the Latin American region have generally avoided 
criticizing one another publicly. Consequently, this is not solely a historical step for the ICC but 
a monumental regional rebuke of President Nicolás Maduro. 
The six countries behind the referral to the ICC are requesting ICC’s top prosecutor, Fatou 
Bensouda, to pursue an investigation of Venezuelan senior officials’ involvement in CAH since 
February 2014. Before this referral, Ms. Bensouda announced in February 2018 that the ICC was 
launching a “preliminary examination” into allegations of large-scale human rights violations in 
the context of demonstrations and related political unrest occurring in Venezuela, since April 
2017. The goal of a preliminary examination by an ICC prosecutor is to determine whether the 
Court should proceed with a full investigation, which can open the door to criminal 
charges. However, the recent State referral will not result in an additional, separate preliminary 
examination but will likely provide an additional basis for Ms. Bensouda’s current ongoing 
review and analysis. The referral will also help expedite the process of opening a full 
investigation. Normally, authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court is required 
before beginning a full investigation; however, this is no longer required when dealing with 
cases by State party referrals, such as this one. Nevertheless, a full investigation is by no means 
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guaranteed; it is ultimately dependent on Ms. Bensouda’s evaluation and conclusion following 
the preliminary examination. Customarily, ICC investigations also tend to last years, making it 
highly unlikely that charges will be filed any time soon. 
Although the results of the preliminary examination will not be announced for a while, this 
timeline should not cloud the importance of the referral, and its groundbreaking impact on both a 
regional and international scale. First, this unprecedented step has made headlines across the 
world, bringing attention to the gravity of the human rights crisis in Venezuela and the 
Venezuelan government’s role in committing CAH domestically. Second, this referral will likely 
encourage other countries to make state referrals to the ICC in the future and has already resulted 
in other countries condemning the acts occurring against Venezuelan citizens. Third, the referral 
will help galvanize other neighboring countries who seek to isolate President Maduro’s 
increasingly authoritarian government. Fourth, these six countries have given The Hague-based 
tribunal a renewed sense of urgency to investigate these crimes, while sending a clear message to 
the international community that the leaders of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, 
and Peru will no longer act complacent as this crisis continues to unfold. Lastly and most 
importantly, the referral has instilled much-needed hope within the victims of these atrocities, 
who have waited far too long for neighboring countries to address and act on these urgent issues. 
Luis Almagro, the secretary general of the OAS, said it best: “The leaders of these six countries 
have taken a historic step today, unprecedented in the history of the Americas, creating a crucial 
milestone in the interests of justice, accountability, non-repetition and reparation to the victims 
of the Venezuelan dictatorship.” 
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Migrants Become Vulnerable to Sex 
Trafficking as the Venezuelan Crisis 
Continues 
December 9, 2018 
by Marcela Velarde 
Human trafficking is rising as more and more migrant women flee the political and economic 
crises in Venezuela, becoming vulnerable to sexual slavery. With a severely depleted job market, 
migrants are often lured by false promises of paid work and security and taken to countries like 
Colombia, where their smugglers may physically restrain them. In these largely invisible 
situations, migrants are forced to work long hours with little to no pay, are indebted to their 
smugglers who helped them escape Venezuela, and are exposed to physical and psychological 
violence. Additionally, the smugglers deter these women from escaping by threatening to kill 
their families. 
Around 4,500 Venezuelan sex workers are in Colombia; however, as sex work is legal in 
Colombia, it is often difficult to determine who entered sex work voluntarily and who was 
coerced. The Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) recognized that sex workers are vulnerable 
and deserve protection without discrimination because they have the same rights as people in 
other industries. However, Venezuelan migrants, with no work authorization or proper 
documentation, do not receive these protections and are easy targets for criminal 
organizations taking advantage of the conditions in Venezuela. As of July 2018, the United 
Nations estimates that 2.3 million Venezuelans have migrated, with Colombia being the main 
recipient, which helps these illegal practices flourish. The political and economic crises in 
Venezuela have resulted in a dire refugee situation where migrants who feel powerless are forced 
into sex work to provide for their loved ones. 
Since 2004, the United States has repeatedly found Venezuela noncompliant with U.S. standards 
for combatting human trafficking and maintaining victim protection and prevention efforts. 
According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report, Venezuela has 
not fully met the minimum standards in its efforts to eliminate human trafficking. Although 
Venezuela has criminalized all forms of trafficking in women and girls, the government has not 
prosecuted traffickers or identified trafficking victims. As a result of Venezuela’s deteriorating 
economic situation with no anti-trafficking plan imposed by the government, the report affirms 
many people from Venezuela have been forced to flee to neighboring countries. While the report 
stated that Colombia fully meets the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking, it 
also noted that at least 600,000 Venezuelans migrated to Colombia since February 2018. 
Additionally, Bogota’s Women’s Secretary interviewed sex workers in Colombia and reported 
that thirty-five percent of people involved were from Venezuela and seventeen percent were 
forced into working in the industry. Colombia has struggled to identify and provide services to 
potential trafficking victims due to the cost and lack of resources to handle the rapid influx of 
migrants. Given the migrants’ vulnerable situation, sex trafficking is probably underreported. 
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Both Venezuela and Colombia have international legal obligations they should enforce 
domestically to address human trafficking. Both have ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children enacted on November 15, 
2000, which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime. State parties are obligated to adopt legislation that criminalizes trafficking in persons as 
defined by the Protocol and should provide assistance to protect victims of trafficking through 
identifying victims, enabling their concerns to be presented, and implementing measures to 
provide for physical and psychological recovery. Additionally, even though Venezuela 
denounced the American Convention on Human Rights in 2012, Colombia is still a state party 
with the legal obligation to prohibit all forms of slavery and trafficking in women, including 
forced labor that adversely affects the dignity and physical capacity of a person. 
 
Moreover, both countries are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which state 
similar rights. The three main legal obligations arising from these international human rights 
treaties are to criminalize trafficking in persons in domestic legislation; prevent, investigate, and 
prosecute criminals; and protect victims of trafficking, which both countries have struggled with 
according to the Trafficking in Persons Report. Additionally, the CCC ruled that Venezuelan sex 
workers are entitled to work visas by considering the reasons they decide to migrate to Colombia 
and the circumstances they may face if returned to Venezuela. As a result, Colombia 
should implement a legal framework that protects sex workers along with regulation to verify 
that they are not subjected to exploitative conditions, thus distinguishing human trafficking 
victims. 
 
The political and economic crises in Venezuela are one of the main reasons Venezuelan migrants 
have fled to neighboring countries where they have been deceived by misleading work 
opportunities, exposing migrants to sexual slavery. Venezuela needs to work with the 
surrounding governments, including Colombia, by implementing international human rights 
treaties, prosecuting these criminal organizations at a local and international level, and 
encouraging law enforcement to follow the appropriate protocol when responding to human 
trafficking cases. Unfortunately, this largely invisible problem is disproportionately impacting 
women, targeting migrants and those vulnerable to sexual and gender based violence. Ultimately, 
the political and economic crises in Venezuela have to be resolved and more gender-focused 
legislation should be implemented for Venezuela to address and eliminate the conditions that 
lead to devastating exploitation of women. 
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Chile and Bolivia: An Analysis of the ICJ 
Decision 
December 10, 2018 
by Shelsea Ramirez 
On October 1, 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its judgment in Bolivia’s 
case against Chile, rejecting Bolivia’s arguments that Chile had an obligation to negotiate 
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia. Bolivia, a landlocked state with limited access 
to the sea neighboring Chile, sought to obligate Chile to negotiate on their terms. 
The case stemmed from the consequences of the War of the Pacific between Bolivia and Peru 
against Chile, which rendered Bolivia landlocked. A 1904 Peace Treaty between Chile and 
Bolivia sealed the territorial status quo. The ICJ held that after the 1904 Peace Treaty, Chile 
never accepted any legal obligation to negotiate a sovereign access to the ocean. Chile currently 
allows Bolivia duty-free access to the port of Arica, but Bolivia sought to have a passage, 
including a train line and port, under its own control. According to the World Bank, landlocked 
states are the most economically vulnerable. Oftentimes, their communities are developmentally 
hindered. It affects most aspects of the community, including security, economy, and foreign 
policy. The Bolivian government argued that restoring sovereign access to the sea would 
revolutionize the economy, which currently has the second lowest per capita GDP in South 
America. Bolivian officials have previously stated that the country’s annual GDP growth would 
be twenty percent higher if it still had a route to international waters. 
As a result of the ICJ’s ruling, Bolivia cannot hold Chile to any obligation or impose any 
negotiations that would question the territorial integrity of Chile. The ICJ’s ruling recognized 
the history of dialogue, exchanges, and negotiations between the two states as well as the 
attempts to resolve the landlocked situation of Bolivia following the War of the Pacific and the 
1904 Peace Treaty. However, the ICJ did not see this history as binding on Chile and therefore 
reinforced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) protection of transit 
states. Although only noted once in the ICJ’s judgement, Article 125 of UNCLOS is of particular 
importance because it directly discusses the rights of landlocked states, like Bolivia, and transit 
states, like Chile. 
Both states demonstrably recognize the importance of Paragraph One of Article 125, which 
states that landlocked states have the right to access the sea through the territory of transit states 
to exercise the rights outlined in UNCLOS. Paragraph Two states that the transit state and the 
landlocked state shall agree upon the terms of access to the sea through “bilateral, subregional, or 
regional agreements.” The ICJ notes Bolivia’s belief that the 1984 declaration made upon 
signature of the UNCLOS that mentioned negotiations to restore sovereign access to the sea 
required a response from Chile. Bolivia believed that Chile’s subsequent silence on the 
declaration and their engagement in negotiations with Bolivia solidified Chile’s obligation to 
negotiate sovereign access. This obligation would emphasize Paragraph Two because it would 
reserve more rights for landlocked states than transit states. 
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Paragraph Three of Article 125 asserts that transit states have the right to ensure that the 
landlocked states do not infringe on the sovereignty of their territories. Chile contends that there 
is no obligation to negotiate and Bolivia failed to prove that one was created by acquiescence. 
Silence on a declaration made on the signing of UNCLOS does not create a legal obligation. The 
ICJ stated, “acquiescence is equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct 
which the other party may interpret as consent” and no such conduct occurred to create a legal 
obligation on Chile. 
Bolivia’s attempt to impose on the sovereignty of Chile, a transit state, violated Article 125. 
Chile and Bolivia have an established agreement that allows Bolivia the right of access to and 
from the sea as well as its freedom to exercise the rights stated in UNCLOS, but Bolivia sought 
more. Had the ICJ ruled in Bolivia’s favor, it would have created a precedent that would allow 
landlocked states to put their needs before the sovereignty and rights of the transit states they 
would impede upon. On the other hand, Bolivia continues to have difficulties as a landlocked 
state that could have been eased had the judgment been in its favor. The ICJ decision reinforces 
the economic vulnerability that Bolivia faces as a landlocked state. The most obvious handicap is 
the reliance on transit states to implement treaties that gives Bolivia, and similar landlocked 
states, access to ports to develop their trade. The Economist reports that companies 
often consider landlocked nations unreliable trading partners because their trade can be 
interrupted by transit states. For example, in 2013, Chilean customs officials went on strike and 
negatively affected the Bolivian companies who were trying to pass through customs to access 
the ports. It is estimated that the Bolivian GDP would be one-fifth higher if they had continuous 
access to the sea. 
Nevertheless, the ICJ encouraged both Chile and Bolivia to continue their dialogues and 
exchanges as had been done in the past. The Court encouraged “good neighbourliness” and 
recognized that it was in both their interests to undertake willing and meaningful negotiations. 
The case will likely hold a significant impact on the negotiations between transit states and 
landlocked states in the future. Transit states will emphasize their sovereignty and note that there 
is no legal obligation to give access to the sea particularly if it puts the transit state at risk. The 
case also hinders the economies of developing landlocked states who rely on their access to the 
sea to improve their economy. 
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